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The results obtained by Cardon and Sasaki (1998) on R&D clustering
are derived under the speci…c assumption that …rms only can own one
patent. When multiple patents are allowed, R&D clustering will come
about more frequently if search costs are substantial.
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1 Introduction
In a recent article, Cardon and Sasaki (1998) investigate the problem of choosing
between multiple R&D paths. Firms essentially have two possible strategies to
deal with two di¤erent R&D projects available simultaneously. Either they will
take up the same research project (cluster) or they will follow a di¤erent path
(separate). In the clustering case, there can only be one winner of the R&D
game. That …rm is rewarded a patent, so it earns the monopoly pro…ts in the
market, but just for one period because afterwards the loosing …rm takes up the
project left previously not researched. After completing the left-over project, the
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1market structure changes into duopoly since the projects lead to new products
that compete with each other for consumers. In the separation case where a
coordinating device assures that each …rm chooses a di¤erent project, the …rms
each own a patent on a new technology and hence become duopolists right away.
Cardon and Sasaki then show that the strategy of tackling …rst one and the
same project (i.e. R&D clustering) can be explained by the desire of …rms to
collude stochastically. This is indeed what happens when by tossing a coin the
patent o¢cer decides to grant the rights to one of the two claimants each of
them having pursued the same research avenue. They then make explicit the
circumstances where it pays to target the monopoly pro…ts for one period rather
than the duopoly outcome, although it is clear a priori that only one …rm can
be lucky in getting a one period monopoly position.
From intuition, it already is obvious that the willingness to engage in such a
clustering strategy on the one hand will depend on the availability of a rescue
possibility or safety net for the …rm who happens to loose the coin tossing game
played by the patent o¢cer. In the present paper, it is argued that the project
left alone by the …rms in the previous stage cannot fully act as a rescue device
to the unlucky …rm, because there is no reason to believe that this project will
be exclusively available to this …rm. On the contrary, the lucky winner of the
coin tossing game will be at least as interested in this project since to him it
is an opportunity to extend his monopoly pro…ts. This possibility on the other
hand then is an element that makes the clustering strategy more appealing.
Moreover, it can be the case that the loosing …rm does not …nd it attractive
2to develop the remaining technology because the expected duopoly pro…ts fall
short of the R&D costs. In that case the winner of the …rst stage remains a
monopolist forever, without even doing R&D on the project not yet developed.
A priori, it is unclear which e¤ect will dominate and therefore it is worthwhile
to investigate in more detail the direction and magnitude of these forces.
In order to do this, the paper is organized as follows: the next section recon-
siders the Cardon and Sasaki model and proves a lemma and two propositions.
The lemma identi…es a condition © which is crucial for what happens in the
subgame that starts after …rms decided to cluster in the …rst stage. The …rst
proposition compares the payo¤s for clustering with those of a separate strategy
when no patent law restrictions are involved. The second proposition shows the
direction of the bias when such laws are unrealistically invoked. A third section
concludes while o¤ering some thoughts on relating some of the recent …ndings to
an existing literature on the persistency of monopoly and sequential innovation.
2 The Simplest Model of Search Paths Recon-
sidered
Two a priori identical …rms can tackle two di¤erent potential technologies that,
when developed, are separately patentable but produce substitute products.
Nothing prevents a …rm to pursue a patent portfolio strategy, that is to own the
claims on more than one technology. For the remainder, all the assumptions
and notation in Cardon and Sasaki are maintained.
Now consider the subgame that results after players have chosen to cluster
3and the patent o¢cer has tossed the coin to determine the winner of the R&D




t¦2 (condition ©). This
condition assures that the loosing …rm will remain interested in the project
not yet researched, when it knows that the winning …rm also may capture the
remaining innovation. Indeed, the following lemma can be shown:
Lemma 1 Either (i) both …rms cluster on the remaining technology or (ii) no
…rm at all develops this technology.
Proof. Proof: W.l.o.g. assume …rm 1 was lucky to win the patent on tech-




t¦2 (condition ©) or the reverse
(condition n©) holds. If © holds, the looser will develop the remaining technol-
ogy but then a fortiori the winner also will develop this technology implying (i).
To show this formally note that …rm 1 (the monopolist) has two alternatives. Ei-
ther it ”sits” and then it will earn from the next period on the duopoly pro…t ¦2
per unit of time, or the overall amount
P1
t=1 ±
t¦2: As an alternative, the monop-
olist could develop the technological path left over, that is project B. Expected













































t (¦1 ¡ 2¦2) ¸ 0; where the …rst inequality results from replacing
the cost of the project by the pro…ts necessary to get …rm 2 started, that is
the assumption that condition © holds. The second inequality follows from
the fact that any duopolistic market structure can at most yield half of the
monopoly pro…ts. Firm 1 therefore will expect more from trying to continue his
4monopoly position and thus will start researching the remaining project rather
than ”sit”, hence (i). If condition n© holds, the loosing …rm quits and …rm A
remains a monopolist who doesn’t need to develop the remaining technology
either, proving (ii).
The implication of lemma 1 is that a …rm who is unfortunate in a clustering
strategy will not simply earn
P1
t=1 ±
t¦2 if it sinks C;as assumed by Cardon
and Sasaki. Since Gilbert and Newbery (1982), it is known that incumbent
monopolists have stronger incentives than outsiders to acquire non-drastic in-
novations, both with a deterministic and a stochastic R&D technology as shown
by Yi (1995). Hence, once two …rms have clustered on a research project, they
will also cluster on the remaining one, unless some exogenous fact prevents them
from owning more than one patent. This implies that the equilibrium payo¤s for
the clustering case are di¤erent from those put forward by Cardon and Sasaki,
and a fortiori that the comparison between clustering or following a di¤erent
research strand is not entirely accurate. Indeed, at the outset when deciding
between a di¤erentiated versus a clustered technological path, …rms will take




t¦2 when they loose the
…rst round in the clustering strategy. This expression either is positive (condi-
tion ©), but then there will be competition on the remaining project, or it is
negative (condition n©) ensuring that the monopoly lasts forever.
Before entering into a formal comparison between clustering and a separate
R&D strategy, it is useful to summarize the elements that will matter. First,
when condition © holds: in favor of clustering is the possibility that one has two
5successes in a row and earns the monopoly pro…ts forever. Against clustering is
the fact that the rescue net is not exclusively available to the looser of the …rst
stage while …rms in addition have to realize that no matter what the outcome
of the …rst project is, they also have to engage in the second project and hence
must incur twice the search costs. A priori, it is not clear that one of these
e¤ects should dominate over the others. Next, when the looser is preempted
(condition n© holds), clustering implies giving up a certain duopoly pro…t for
the chance of becoming a monopolist forever. Since these duopoly pro…ts tend
to be to low (expected duopoly pro…ts are not su¢cient to cover up for the R&D
costs), there is a presumption that trying to become a monopolist forever and
hence following a clustering strategy could be the best thing to do. In any case,
the stake is an extension of the monopoly position beyond period two. Either by
preemption or by being lucky twice in a row, clustering opens the perspective to
earn the monopoly pro…ts forever.
A formal comparison of the overall payo¤s of the game enables to prove the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 (i) Whenever it is the case that condition n© holds, regardless
the magnitude of the duopoly pro…ts, the search costs or the level of the discount
factor, the …rms choose a shared path in any pure strategy equilibrium. (ii)
Whenever condition © holds, the …rms in any pure strategy equilibrium only
choose a separate path when the product market structure is not too competitive
and the discount factor not too high.
Proof. First consider the case where condition n© applies. The di¤er-


















¸ 0;again by the fact
that a duopolistic market structure can yield at most half of the monopoly prof-
its. So when condition n© holds, following a shared path strategy yields at least
as much pro…ts than following a separate strategy, proving (i). Next consider
the case where condition © applies. When …rms follow a di¤erentiated research
strategy, they will earn ¡C+
P1
t=1 ±
t¦2. If they on the contrary decide to clus-















































±¡1 : A separate strategy then will be followed i¤ simul-
taneously the following two conditions are satis…ed:


















In order to satisfy both © and ª it is clear that the product market struc-
ture cannot be too competitive and the discount factor not too high as be-
comes clear from substituting ¦2 = 0 and ± = 1 in respectively © and ª,
each time resulting in a violation of the respective constraint, proving (ii).
Proposition 1 is not intended to create the impression that the scope of a
separate R&D strategy rather is limited and hence that properly taking into
account the fact that a monopolist can tackle research avenues previously disre-
garded, increases the attractiveness of R&D clustering. The range of parameter
7values sustaining a separate research strategy has to be compared to the range
obtained by Cardon and Sasaki to conclude wether the possibility to extend
the monopoly position over-or undercompensates for the reduced possibility of
a safety net and the additional search costs. But it certainly is the case that
part (i) of proposition 1 identi…es a range for the cost parameter that induces
clustering and that is absent when …rms only may own one patent. Next we
provide a full characterization of the optimal R&D strategies in function of the
cost parameter C.
The approach is to simplify the model even further. In that respect it is
useful to note that the analysis above can be carried out in a two-period model
without loosing a single detail of the argument. In addition, a two period model
allows for bounded pro…ts in the presence of no discounting. While not strictly
needed, assuming ± = 1 allows an easy and entirely complete characterization of
the optimality of the respective R&D strategies in function of the search costs.
In such a two period world, the conditions derived by Cardon and Sasaki to
distinguish between separated and clustered R&D identically remain the same.
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4 (¦1 ¡ 2¦2)
Therefore:
Proposition 3 Whenever feasible, a separate strategy becomes less likely in a
scenario where …rms may own patent portfolio’s when search costs are substan-
8tial, while a separate strategy will be followed more often in the presence of lower
search costs.
Proof. According to Cardon and Sasaki, a necessary and su¢cient con-
dition for a separate R&D strategy is that 2¦2 ¸ C > ¦1 ¡ 2¦2;where the
…rst inequality is due to the fact that a separate R&D strategy has to yield
positive pro…ts. When patent portfolio’s are allowed, a separate strategy only
comes about when: 1
2¦2 ¸ C > 3
4 (¦1 ¡ 2¦2): These regions are assumed to
be non-empty, which implies that ¦2 cannot be too small. More precisely, a
su¢cient condition to allow for the possibility of a separate strategy both with
and without restrictions on holding patents is: ¦2 > 3
8¦1: It then is easy to
note that 2¦2 > 1
2¦2; whereas 3
4 (¦1 ¡2¦2) < 1(¦1 ¡ 2¦2). Clearly, these
last inequalities put less restrictions on the level of the costs from below (mean-
ing that a separate strategy already will come about at lower cost levels), but
more restrictions on the level of costs from above (meaning that the separate
strategy will vanish sooner as R&D cost rises, to become a clustered strategy).
It is easy to show that these results nowhere depend on the assumption that
± = 1. Again proposition 2 is backed by intuition: substantial research costs
quickly imply preemption. As shown, this entails an advantage in favor of a
clustered strategy, especially because the persistence of monopoly comes with-
out incurring the search costs twice. When search costs are lower, a clustered
strategy still has to some extent an (incomplete) preemptive e¤ect but at the
cost of incurring the search costs twice, making it less appealing.The results
9obtained in relation to Proposition 2 can be summarized by means of a …gure
indicating the optimal research strategy as a function of the level of the costs
C.
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The interpretation is simple: a ”C” denotes that the equilibrium strategy
is to cluster, an ”S” indicates that it is better to separate and …nally ”/” de-
notes no R&D undertaken. On top is the outcome predicted by Cardon and
Sasaki while below the results from the present paper are illustrated. As al-
ready argued, when …rms may own more than one patent costs cannot increase
too much for clustering to outperform separation due to the duplication that
necessarily follows in any clustering strategy. However, this conclusion certainly
is not linear as claimed by Cardon and Sasaki in that clustering re-appears as
the optimal outcome as soon as costs become big enough. Finally, …gure 1 shows
that ownership of multiple patents makes a di¤erence regarding whether R&D
will be done at all. The preemptive e¤ect of high search costs adds to the appeal
10of a clustering strategy to such an extent that innovation is taken up beyond
cost levels for which R&D is not sensible anymore if no multiple patents are
allowed.
Given the above conclusion, there will be circumstances under which the
market only will take up research activities if multiple patents may be owned.
This leads to the well-known trade-o¤ between static and dynamic e¢ciency.
On the static side, it is best to have two innovators who then compete in the
product market afterwards, at least when markups create dead weight losses.
With restrictions on patent holding, this situation inevitably will come about,
either directly when …rms engage along the separate path, or after one period
when they cluster. Without restrictions on patent holding, there is a danger of
perpetual monopoly in one quarter of the cases when conditions © and nª hold
simultaneously. In addition then, there is the unnecessary duplication of search
costs inducing a welfare loss of 2±C: When condition n© holds, a monopoly will
exist forever, but the search cost will only be incurred once. But, when these
search costs are substantial, R&D will be taken up in cases where no R&D
would be done in the absence of multiple patent ownership.
Therefore, the following recommendations for patent and technological poli-
cies can be formulated. If dead weight losses resulting from monopoly pricing
tend to be small, for example due to very inelastic demand, while search costs
are substantial, the static losses of monopoly can be compensated by the dy-
namic gain from getting the innovation. If static welfare losses from monopoly
are substantial while the costs are not prohibitive, clustering should be avoided.
11In this case now, clustering occurs when costs are low, calling for the eventual
taxation of R&D expenditures. Moreover, for the results related to proposition
2, it is clear that clustering will take place more often when patent ownership is
restricted. That is, taxation will need to be more severe. The general conclusion
therefore tends to be that restricting patent ownership might not be such a good
thing. Let alone for implementation motives left outside the scope of this paper
such as the requirement that patent o¢cers can distinguish if one technology
is a substitute for the other. It would require from them antitrust expertise to
delineate the relevant market for a set of technologies.
3 Conclusion
In the present paper it has been argued that Cardon and Sasaki implicitly
assume that the winner of a clustering R&D strategy cannot participate in
further R&D races. This implies that there are restrictions on owning more than
one patent. In the absence of such restrictions, one has to show endogenously
that the winner of the …rst stage will ”sit” on his innovation and remain inactive.
This is not the case, on the contrary he will participate in the development of
the research avenues left over in the …rst stages of a clustering strategy. This
reduces the appeal of such a strategy by decreasing the importance of a rescue
strategy and by inducing the duplication of costs. If however the search costs
are substantial, it becomes possible that they act preemptively, adding to the
appeal of a clustering strategy, the latter now entailing perpetual monopoly
pro…ts without requiring twice the sinking of search costs.
12As in much of the innovation literature, searching is assumed to be a sunk
cost. Therefore, it is not surprising that general insights on the evolution of
industry also apply to the present model. Sutton (1991) has clearly shown how
industries characterized by high sunk costs together with low pro…ts (either
as the result of strong price competition and/or weak product di¤erentiation)
will remain monopolistic even tough the size of the market increases and hence
entry opportunities occur. Related insights to those explored here also are to
be found in the sequential innovation literature, see e.g. Vickers (1986), Green
and Scotchmer (1995) and Gandal and Rockett (1995). More in particular the
impact of product market competition on the persistency of monopoly is well
documented. While in those papers innovation opportunities present them-
selves subsequently, Cardon and Sasaki have introduced a model where sequen-
tial searching for innovation is an endogenously determined outcome, namely if
…rms choose to cluster rather than separate. But in analyzing the equilibrium
outcome, the economic forces analyzed in the sequential innovation literature
should be taken into account. If this is done, the result by Vickers that competi-
tive market structures (for instance homogeneous Bertrand competition) lead to
increased dominance is recon…rmed. Indeed, strong competition induces cluster-
ing which is associated with the persistence of monopoly. But also the threat of
the future erosion of monopoly pro…ts as documented by Green and Scotchmer
has its in‡uence. If search costs are substantial, the fact that also the winner
of the …rst patent will race for the second in‡uences the decision to cluster.
These forces will also a¤ect the analysis of the many interesting extensions
13considered by Cardon and Sasaki. For example consider the case of more …rms
and more paths. Since there exist circumstances in which all …rms will search on
all projects, a novel question is whether they do this simultaneously or sequen-
tially. In the …rst case they all immediately will sink mC, where m denotes the
number of projects, while in the other case they will tackle a project, observe the
outcome and continue until a duopolistic market structure exists. Preliminary
calculations indicate that the latter is the optimal strategy.
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